University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiCen

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

10-15-1986

Salvadoran Earthquake Likely To Spark New
Political Conflicts
Deborah Tyroler

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen
Recommended Citation
Tyroler, Deborah. "Salvadoran Earthquake Likely To Spark New Political Conflicts." (1986). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/
noticen/65

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiCen by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 077855
ISSN: 1089-1560

Salvadoran Earthquake Likely To Spark New Political
Conflicts
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department: General
Published: Wednesday, October 15, 1986
and Barbara Kohl* The Oct. 10 earthquake which struck El Salvador is a natural and human tragedy,
and may spark a political turning point. Natural disasters often unleash political "quakes" in
Latin America which affect the very social fabric of those societies. Two recent examples are the
earthquakes occurring in Mexico City last year, and in Managua in December 1972. The earth
tremors affecting Mexico City in 1985 produced considerable political turmoil. Since then, the
Mexican political opposition has systematically challenged the legitimacy of the ruling Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), an unprecedented development since the 1930s. The government
of President Miguel de la Madrid, however, will likely recover from the earthquake aftermath
because of its ability to draw on numerous political and economic resources. A similar mustering
of resources was not possible in the case of the Nicaraguan government under Anastasio Somoza.
The capital city of Managua was shattered by the 1972 earthquake in which the downtown area
was transformed into rubble, and 10,000 people died. The political crisis began to take shape
when Somoza initiated a reconstruction program to rebuild the entire city. He promised aid to
all earthquake victims, and informed Nicaraguans that about $6 billion would be necessary to do
the job right. The Nicaraguan earthquake hurt the private sector in a major way. Large and small
enterprises were destroyed, while credit sources vanished as a result of fears about re-investment
in Managua. Meanwhile, the Somoza family engaged in an orgy of corruption. Between 1972 and
1979 the Somozas' bank balances increased spectacularly via access to public monies and foreign
aid. The anger and frustration experienced by businesspeople and workers soon became active
political opposition. The Somozas' rapidly accumulating wealth in the midst of so much suffering
became intolerable. It was in this political climate that the Sandinistas successfully recruited urban
supporters, particularly among the middle class and the poor. In 1979 the Sandinistas seized power,
and the rest is history. Is it possible that the Salvadoran rulers will go the way of the Somoza
dynasty? In the following important similarities and differences between the Nicaraguan and
Salvadoran situations are presented. Similarities: 1. In 1972 downtown Managua was virtually totally
demolished. Last week's earthquake destroyed an estimated 40% of downtown San Salvador. 2. The
Nicaraguan quake had a dramatic impact on all social classes in the capital city. The same appears
to be true in San Salvador. The latter could become a serious problem if the lion's share of domestic
and foreign aid is channeled into the hands of the middle classes, especially those elements overtly
supportive of the government. Complaints by the poor in San Salvador are already being heard
to the effect that rescue efforts have been concentrated in well-to-do neighborhoods, namely
San Benito and Escandon barrios. One of the most seriously damaged poor barrios is Mexicanos,
whose residents have reportedly been friendly to the rebels. Other poor neighborhoods affected
are San Jacinto, Santa Marta and La Colonia. In his Sunday homily, San Salvador's Archbishop,
Arturo Rivera y Damas, noted that poor barrios were receiving less aid than middle class areas
that had experienced less damage. If proper mechanisms for distribution and control of foreign
aid are not quickly established in El Salvador, large quantities will inevitably be found in the
black market, enriching those who need it the least. In local radio announcements, Salvadoran
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grass roots organizations have already denounced the fact that distribution is in the hands of the
military and private business people linked to the ruling political parties. Next, as occurred in the
Nicaraguan case and elsewhere in Latin America after natural disaster, commodity speculators in
El Salvador are likely to appear. Unless the Duarte government can quickly move to prevent price
inflation in the wake of shortages and corresponding enrichment of speculators, the poor are likely
to bear this extra burden as well. Differences: 1. The Salvadoran earthquake occurred at a very
difficult economic moment that country's history. Nicaraguan economic conditions at the time of
1972 quake were considerably better. The Salvadoran economy is in real trouble. Since 1979, GDP
has dropped between 25 and 35%. Official unemployment is estimated at over 40%. In the 1980s
public investment has been cut in half, while private investment has dropped to 25% of previous
levels. Twenty percent of the Salvadoran population earns 66% of national income, while 68% of
the population subsist on a bare minimum. Observers say the Salvadoran regime has managed
to cope with the economic crisis only because of U.S. economic and military aid, which in 1985
came to over $1.5 million per day. Economic woes have been exacerbated by the civil war. In the
first seven months of 1986, the rebels caused an estimated $60 million in damages as part of their
campaign to cripple the national "war economy." Statistics released by the US Embassy in San
Salvador show that rebel attacks have caused over two billion dollars in damages since 1980. In
brief, the Salvadorn government simply does not have the resources to even begin coping with the
new tragedy. It should be mentioned that the civil war absorbs 40% of the $120 million national
budget. Predictably, Duarte has requested a massive aid package from Washington. 2. Anastasio
Somoza enjoyed much greater control of the political system and the military than does Salvadoran
President Jose Napoleon Duarte. In the last two years Duarte's government has encountered
growing opposition from organized labor. For instance, as a result of economic austerity policies
introduced in January, the country's largest labor federation, the National Unity of Salvadoran
Workers (UNTS) has organized numerous mass protest demonstrations. In early October, the
Salvadoran congress passed a new war tax bill to increase the military budget by some $24 million.
Salvadoran workers have been unrelenting in expressing opposition to the new tax. Next, UNTS and
several civic and human rights groups demand that the government engage in serious negotiations
with the rebels to bring the seven years of civil war to an end. If the Duarte government fails to act
quickly and adequately to meet the subsistence needs of the population affected by the earthquake,
religious and/or civic organizations may step into the vacuum. In other Latin American nations, such
development has led to greater politicization of disaffected populations. Since the state would not
provide adequate resources, the poor were mobilized to pressure the government, demanding that
more be done. Relations between Duarte's government and the military are not exactly harmonious.
It is clear that the armed forces do not follow orders issued by the president. 3. At the time of the
earthquake in Nicaragua, a guerrilla movement capable of immediately exploiting the situation
did not exist. In contrast, the Salvadoran rebels constitute a strong, well-organized movement in
the countryside and the cities. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Movement (FMLN) and
its political arm, the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) may be expected to quickly exploit
frustrations emerging in the aftermath of the earthquake. A related difference here is that the
Somoza regime had not been waging a large-scale civil war when the earthquake struck. The
Salvadoran regime, of course, has been occupied fighting the rebels for the past seven years. In this
regard, the Salvadoran government's ability to maintain political hegemony while simultaneously
continuing its current massive counterinsurgency campaign will likely suffer. Counterinsurgency
is hindered because of seriously damaged electrical and telephone systems. It could be argued
that if Duarte continues to spend large quantities of money on fighting the rebels, reconstruction
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will be delayed for months, perhaps years. If a commitment is made to invest large amounts in
reconstruction, the rebels will be strengthened. Either scenario carries substantial political risk.
4. Nicaragua's Somoza did not confront an enormous domestic refugee population, such as the
Salvadoran government faces at present. Before the earthquake, there were about 600,000 displaced
persons in El Salvador, driven from their homes by the civil war. Those who lost their homes in
San Salvador last week will bring the total to an estimated 800,000, representing over 25% of the
entire population. More homeless persons in El Salvador can only add to discontent focused on the
government. The Duarte regime has not yet begun to meet even minimum needs of the 600,000 civil
war refugees. The aftermath of the earthquake piles of rubble, impassable streets, open air schools,
and woefully inadequate medical facilities, to name but a few of the more visible factors will serve
as a constant reminder to Salvadorans of what remains to be done by a "responsible government."
Based on the above considerations, one of the following developments may occur: 1. The Nicaraguan
process will be repeated in El Salvador, but in a time frame much shorter than seven years. 2.
The Salvadoran government will demonstrate greater willingness to negotiate with the rebels
in the future. (There are no indications of this at present. The rebels called for a temporary truce
immediately after the earthquake, which the government rejected.) 3. The army will seize power.
The armed forces have already imposed a near-state of siege in San Salvador's debris-choked
streets. Military leaders alleged the rebels were mounting an imminent attack. An important factor
in determining the contours of future developments in El Salvador in the earthquake's aftermath
is, of course, US strategy to assist the Salvadoran government in meeting new challenges. The
earthquake damaged the US embassy beyond repair. In addition to constructing a new building,
Washington will be busily engaged in mapping out new plans to keep its Salvadoran allies in power.
[*Prof. Valdes teaches sociology at the University of New Mexico and is director of the Latin America
Data Base (LADB). Dr. Kohl is LADB managing editor.]
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